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Abstract
Many optimal contracting papers use quasi-linear preferences. To exclude
stochastic mechanisms they impose a (sufficient) condition on how the curva-
ture of an agent’s objective function varies with type. We show with quasi-linear
preferences that an optimal deterministic outcome without bunching implies that
stochastic mechanisms are not optimal (without any additional assumptions).
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1. Introduction
Since the introduction of adverse selection by Akerlof (1970) and Mirrlees (1971), an
extensive literature on this topic has emerged. The overwhelming majority of contri-
butions on this topic analyzes deterministic contracts although it is commonly believed
that random contracts can be efficient, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 2.3)
and Laffont and Martimort (2002, ch. 2.13) for textbook accounts of this. The idea is
that randomness in contracts could be used to relax incentive compatibility constraints.
However, random contracts are hardly observed in practice. Hence, there seems to be a
mismatch between theory and real world and several more or less plausible explanations
have been brought forward to explain it, see for example Arnott and Stiglitz (1988).
This paper shows that the intuition explaining why random contracts dominate de-
terministic contracts is slightly flawed. This intuition suggests that already in fairly
standard models, random contracts improve on deterministic mechanisms. The incor-
rect intuition originates from an error repeatedly made in the small literature on optimal
random contracts. We show that random contracts cannot improve upon the optimal
deterministic contract in a standard principal agent framework with quasi-linear pref-
erences. Therefore, the non-existence of random contracts in practice is less surprising
and the contributions on optimal deterministic contracts with quasi-linear preferences
are more general than previously thought.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section explains the argument in
favor of random contracts and the flaw in this reasoning. Section 3 shows that random
contracts are never optimal in a two type principal agent model. Section 4 generalizes
the result to a continuous type framework.
2. The standard intuition
To fix ideas think of a two type principal agent model. Call the types θh and θl. Under
the optimal contracting scheme the incentive compatibility constraint of one of the types,
say of θh will bind, i.e. θh is indifferent between his contract and the contract intended for
θl. The standard explanation why random contracts can be optimal is along the following












Figure 1: indifference curves through θl contract
2.13) for textbook expositions and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) or Brito et al. (1995) for
research papers). Start from the optimal deterministic contract. Now consider giving θl a
random contract which (for simplicity) randomizes between contracts that are close to his
deterministic contract. If θh is more risk averse than θl (this boils down to an assumption
on the third derivative cqqθ in our framework below), this randomization relaxes the
binding incentive compatibility constraint. If the difference in risk aversion is big enough,
the relaxation of the incentive constraint is big enough to more than compensate for the
loss due to randomization (after all, θl is risk averse as well). Therefore, randomization
can improve upon deterministic contracts whenever the types differ sufficiently in risk
aversion.
This reasoning originates in the literature on optimal income taxation where a similar
argument is stated slightly more formal, see for example theorem 2 in Brito et al. (1995).
This argument suggests that small changes in a standard set up can make stochastic
contracts optimal. Take figure 1 as illustration. Figure 1 depicts the indifference curves
of the two types and the principal through the θl contract. The contract consists of a
transfer tl and a decision ql. Now the idea is the following: Instead of the deterministic
(ql, tl), assign θl a random contract consisting of a random mix between (q1, t1) and
(q2, t2). As both are on the same indifference curve, the utility of θ
l does not change.
Furthermore, one can choose the probability weights such that the expected utility of
the principal remains unaffected as well. Therefore, this random contract will improve
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on the deterministic one if and only if the incentive constraint is relaxed.
Now consider a concave transformation of the utility of θh, i.e. the utility function of
θh is no longer uh(q, t) but F (uh(q, t)) where F is an increasing and concave function.1
Note that such a transformation does not change the shape of the indifference curves of
type θh. It only changes the cardinal utility differences between contracts on different
indifference curves. The concavity of F means that θh cares less about the utility dif-
ference between (ql, tl) and (q2, t2) compared to the utility difference between (q
l, tl) and
(q1, t1). By choosing F sufficiently concave, the above suggested random contract will
relax the incentive constraint for θh. To illustrate, one can think of the extreme function
F (u) = u if u < uh(ql, tl) and F (u) = uh(ql, tl) if u ≥ uh(ql, tl) which guarantees that
the incentive constraint is relaxed. By continuity, one can then also choose a strictly
increasing F that still relaxes the binding incentive constraint. The result is that for
concave enough uh functions random contracts are always optimal.
What is the flaw in this reasoning? The problem is that as soon as one transforms
uh the optimal deterministic contract changes. The reasoning above only shows that the
proposed random contract is better than the initial deterministic contract. However, the
optimal deterministic contract under the transformed utility function differs from the
initial deterministic contract.
Intuitively, the concave transformation is designed to make θh more indifferent be-
tween (ql, tl) and slightly“higher”contracts, i.e. contracts in the direction of (q2, t2). But
this implies that the standard distortion for rent extraction reasons becomes less relevant
for the principal: the θl contract is distorted away from first best to extract more rents
from the θh type. If this θh type cares less about utility differences for slightly “higher”
contracts, it is efficient to reduce the distortion. The easiest way to see this is again the
extreme F described above: If these are θh’s preferences, one can assign θl his first best
contract without affecting incentive compatibility.
A second story why stochastic mechanisms are optimal is that they help to convexify
the domain. We explain why this intuition does not carry through in our setup in the
supplementary material to this paper.
1We depart here from the quasi-linear utility setup we will analyze in the paper. This allows to see
the problem with the standard intuition more clearly.
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3. Non-optimality in a principal agent framework
Take a principal agent model. The principal has utility S(q)− t of some decision q and
transfer t where S(q) is twice differentiable, increasing and concave. The agent has utility
u(q, t, θ) = t− c(q, θ) where θ is his type which is private information. The cost function
is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing and convex in q with c(0, θ) = 0.2 Both
principal and agent maximize expected utility.
To simplify things as much as possible, this section assumes that there are only two
types θh and θl. The principal’s prior assigns probability f i to type θi with fh = 1− f l.
To rule out countervailing incentives it is assumed that c(q, θh) < c(q, θl) for q > 0,
i.e. the high type is better absolutely. In addition, an agent has an outside option
normalized to zero, i.e. the offered contracts have to satisfy the individual rationality
constraint ti − c(qi, θi) ≥ 0. Note that we do not make assumptions on cqqθ which are
generally used to rule out the optimality of stochastic contracts (Laffont and Martimort,
2002, pp. 65/6).
Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint
ti − c(qi, θi) ≥ tj − c(qj, θi) with i, j ∈ {h, l} and i 6= j (IC)











s.t. : ti − c(qi, θi) ≥ 0 with i ∈ {h, l}
ti − c(qi, θi) ≥ tj − c(qj, θi) with i, j ∈ {h, l} and i 6= j
With the assumptions above the following lemma is standard in the literature. As
shown in the proof (in the appendix), this result also holds when we allow for random
contracts.
Lemma 1. Under the optimal contract scheme, the individual rationality constraint of
θl and the incentive compatibility constraint of θh are binding. The individual rationality
constraint of θh and the incentive compatibility constraint for θl are lax. Furthermore,
qh is the first best decision, i.e. qh = argmaxqS(q)− c(q, θh).
2The concavity of S and convexity of c is only used to establish existence of a deterministic first
best decision and existence of a solution to (1). As long as these two exist, also non-concave S and
non-convex c can be allowed.
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S(qh∗)− c(qh∗, θh) + c(ql, θh)− c(ql, θl)
]
(1)
where qh∗ is the first best decision of type θh. Because of the incentive compatibility
constraint, this program is not necessarily concave. However, it is easy to see that the
objective is approaching −∞ for ql → ∞. Using the Weierstrass theorem (or extreme
value theorem), the maximum for this problem is well defined. The (deterministic)
maximum is achieved either at an interior point or at ql = 0.
Now turn to random decisions. Lemma 1 still applies and also implies that the
decision of θh is non-random (it is the deterministic first best decision). As utilities are
quasilinear in transfers, randomization over ti is immaterial and only randomization over
ql has to be considered. In the literature, two types of arguments are used to show the
optimality of stochastic contracts: local and non-local. We consider each in turn and
local randomizations are considered first.3
Proposition 1. Local randomizations around the optimal deterministic contract of θl
cannot be optimal.
Proof. Let q̃l denote the deterministic optimum of ql and consider a random contract
where θl is assigned q̃l− ε1 with probability p and q̃l + ε2 with probability 1− p.4 Hence,
3Readers familiar with Arnott and Stiglitz (1988, propositions 11 and 12) or Brito et al. (1995, the-
orem 3) may be surprised to see that this local argument rules out stochastic contracts. Indeed, these
authors use this type of argument to prove the optimality of stochastic contracts. In these papers, the
condition that uh has to be “concave enough” at the optimal deterministic ql implies a certain convexity
of the principal’s program at the optimal deterministic contract. Viewing the principal’s optimization
problem as a function of ql shows the tension in this argument. Optimality of the best deterministic
contract requires that the principal’s objective is locally concave at the optimal deterministic ql. Ran-
domizing with a concave objective function, however, reduces the objective value. Randomization can
only work if the objective function is locally convex.
As shown in an example in Brito et al. (1995), the conditions can nevertheless be met. Loosely speak-
ing, this happens when the variable in which the principal’s objective is convex is fixed by constraints.
Hence, the principal has no real choice and therefore his objective does not have to be locally concave at
the optimal deterministic contract. In our standard setting with quasilinear preferences this situation
cannot emerge.
4The proof holds also for more elaborate randomization schemes as long as all ql in the support are
close enough to q̃l, i.e. the randomization is local.
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the principal’s payoff is
W = f l
[




S(qh∗)− c(qh∗, θh) + p c(q̃l − ε1, θh)− p c(q̃l − ε1, θl)
+(1− p)c(q̃l + ε2, θh)− (1− p)c(q̃l + ε2, θl)
]
.
Denote the principal’s deterministic objective by W̃ (ql). Since the focus is on local
stochastic contracts around q̃l, we have for some q̄l1 ∈ [q̃l − ε1, q̃l] and q̄l2 ∈ [q̃l, q̃l + ε2]:
















for ε1,2 > 0 close to 0. The inequality follows from the deterministic optimality of q̃
l:
The first order condition requires dW̃/dql = 0 and d2W̃/dql
2 ≤ 0 at q close to q̃l > 0.
If q̃l = 0 is a corner solution of the deterministic problem, incentive compatibility is
equivalent to the individual rationality constraint of θh. Random ql cannot relax this
constraint.
After ruling out the optimality of local randomization around the deterministic opti-
mum, one might wonder whether non-local randomization can be optimal.
Proposition 2. No random contract can improve on the optimal deterministic contract.
Proof. Suppose that in the optimal contract ql was random and distributed accord-

















W̃ (ql) dP (ql) ≤
∫
ql
W̃ (q̃l) dP (ql) = W̃ (q̃l)
where W̃ (ql) is the principal’s payoff under the deterministic contract ql. The inequality
follows from the definition of q̃l as optimal deterministic ql.
The results above are driven by two assumptions: First, the assumption of quasilinear
utility and, second, the assumption that the high type has lower costs for all levels of q.
Both assumptions are commonplace in the contract theory literature. These assumptions
lead in lemma 1 to the result that θh’s individual rationality constraint is not binding.
Without these two assumptions stochastic contracts can help to implement first best
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decisions where both types individual rationality constraints are binding. To illustrate,
assume now that θh has the following utility function:
û(q, t, θh) = log(th)− c(q, θh) (2)
The utility function of θl and the principal are the same as before. The intuition is now
that θh never wants to misrepresent as θl if tl is 0 with some probability. Therefore,
the following first best contract is implementable for θl: Assign ql∗ to θl accompanied
by transfer 2c(ql∗, θl) with probability 1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2. If the incentive
compatibility constraint of θh is binding under the optimal deterministic contract, the
stochastic contract improves strictly on the deterministic outcome.
4. Continuum of types
The previous section dealt with a two type model. This section shows that some results
carry over to a standard model where the type space is a continuum. The principal still
maximizes the expected value of S(q) − t with q ∈ R+. An agent of type θ has utility
u(q, t, θ) = t−c(q, θ) as in section 3. Principal and agent maximize expected utility. The
type space, however, is now Θ = [θ, θ̄]. The principal has a prior distribution F (θ) with
strictly positive density f(θ) over Θ. The functions S and c are assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable. Furthermore, it is assumed that a finite and positive first
best decision qfb(θ) = argmaxq≥0S(q)− c(q, θ) exists.
The outside option is normalized to 0 for all types. To rule out individual rationality
constraints binding at interior types, cθ < 0 is assumed, i.e. higher types have lower
costs. For simplicity, full participation is assumed; i.e. S(q) − c(q, θ) is high enough so
that the principal does not want to exclude some types.
By the quasi-linearity of the utility functions, randomization over t is again pointless
and is therefore not considered in the remainder. E is used to denote the expectation of
a lottery over q. As every type θ could face a different lottery over q, the expectation
over the lottery intended for type θ will be noted Eθ. The lottery over q for type θ will
be denoted by the distribution G(q, θ).
With a slight abuse of notation, denote the agent’s expected rent under the imple-
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mented mechanism by u(θ). The envelope theorem yields
uθ(θ) = Eθ[−cθ(q(θ), θ)]. (3)
By the assumption cθ < 0, the participation constraint can only bind for the lowest type




Et[−cθ(q(t), t)] dt. (4)







(S(q)− c(q, θ)− u(θ)) dG(q, θ) dF (θ) (5)
s.t. : u(θ) ≥ u(θ̂) + Eθ̂[c(q, θ̂)− c(q, θ)] (IC’)
u(θ) = 0 (IR’)
where t(θ) = u(θ)−Eθc(q, θ) is used to rewrite the objective and the incentive compati-




















dG(q, θ) dF (θ) (6)
where integration by parts is used to get from the first to the second line.
Next the relaxed deterministic solution (qrd(θ), urd(θ)) is defined: qrd is the solution
of the maximization problem








Proposition 3. If the relaxed deterministic solution is implementable, it is the solution
to (5); i.e. random contracts cannot improve on deterministic contracts.
Proof. The principal’s program is a maximization of (6) subject to (IC’) and (IR’).
By the definition of qrd,∫
q
(










for any type θ and any distribution G(q, θ). Consequently, no distribution can lead to a
higher objective (6) than the relaxed deterministic solution. The relaxed deterministic
solution satisfies (IR’) by construction and (IC’) by assumption. Hence, it is the solution
of (5).
The following corollary states standard conditions under which qrd(θ) is implementable.
As these assumptions are often invoked in principal agent models, stochastic contracts
cannot improve the outcome (irrespective of the sign of cqqθ).
Corollary 1. The following conditions are jointly sufficient for the optimality of deter-
ministic contracts:
 single crossing: cqθ < 0
 monotone qrd, i.e. qrdθ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄]
Proof. It is well known that under single crossing non-local incentive constraints are
not binding in deterministic solutions, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 2.3) for a
textbook exposition. Local first order incentive compatibility is satisfied by construction
while monotonicity of qrd ensures second order local incentive compatibility (see again
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 2.3) for a textbook exposition).
Single crossing is a standard assumption in most of the literature. Standard properties
that lead to a monotone qrd are the monotone hazard rate assumption on the type
distribution and cqθθ ≥ 0. Most contract theory papers make these assumptions anyway
in order to be able to use the first order approach. The corollary then says that whenever
the first order approach gives the optimal deterministic contract, no stochastic contract
can improve upon the optimal deterministic contract.
5. Conclusion
The dominant view in the literature is that random contracts can improve upon deter-
ministic contracts in a wide class of problems by relaxing incentive compatibility con-
straints (unless an assumption is made on the sign of cqqθ). This paper shows that this is
not true in a principal agent setting that satisfies commonly made regularity conditions
like quasi-linear utility, single crossing and type independent participation constraints.
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Proof of lemma 1: As this will be useful later on, lemma 1 is proven allowing
for random contracts. Since utilities are linear in transfers, randomization over ti is
immaterial and therefore neglected. Assume that the contract has qi being distributed
according to some distribution P i(qi).
The individual rationality constraint of θh is implied by the incentive compatibil-





c(qh, θh) dP h(qh) ≥ tl −
∫
ql
c(ql, θh) dP l(ql) ≥ tl −
∫
ql
c(ql, θl) dP l(ql) ≥ 0
Note that the second inequality holds strictly whenever P l does not put all probability
mass on 0.
Next it is argued that the incentive compatibility constraint (ICh) of θh has to bind.
Suppose it did not and for now concentrate on the case where qi > 0 with positive
probability for both types. The principal could then increase his payoff by marginally
decreasing th and this decrease would be feasible: It relaxes the incentive constraint of
θl. It tightens the incentive and individual rationality constraint of θh but those do not
bind and are therefore irrelevant for small enough changes of th. Hence, the incentive
constraint of θh has to bind under the optimal contract if qi > 0.
If ql = 0 with probability 1, then the same argument (decreasing th) shows that the
individual rationality constraint of θh has to be binding. As ql = 0 implies tl = 05,
the individual rationality constraint of θh is equivalent to the incentive compatibility
constraint of θh and therefore ICh binds as well.
If qh = 0 with probability 1, then either ICh binds (and that is what we want to
show) or th = 0 (otherwise reducing th is feasible and increases the principal’s payoff).
th = 0 implies then ql = 0 with probability 1 as well. Otherwise, ICh is violated because
of c(q, θl) > c(q, θh) for q > 0. Hence, both types get the same contract, again ICh binds
trivially.
Consequently, ICh will be binding.
5ICl cannot be binding in this case as jointly reducing tl and th by the same ε > 0 would improve
the principal’s payoff without harming any constraint.
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Now it is shown that the individual rationality constraint of θl has to be binding. If
not, decreasing tl and th by the same (small) ε > 0 would increase the principal’s payoff
without harming any binding constraint.
The next step is to show that IC l is not binding whenever qh > 0 with positive
probability. Since c(q, θl) > c(q, θh) for q > 0, a binding IC l would imply that ICh is
lax. But it was just shown that ICh has to bind.
Solving the binding constraints for th and tl and plugging them into the principal’s
objective gives:
W = f l
[∫
ql










c(ql, θh)− c(ql, θl) dP l(ql)
]
With respect to P h, this term is clearly maximized by choosing P h(qh) such that all
probability is put on the first best decision qh∗.
If S is not concave and/or c not convex, the first best decision might not be unique.
Note that the prinipal can–even in this case–still maximize his payoff with a determinsitic
qh (i.e. putting all probability mass of P h on one of the first best decisions).
13
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Supplementary material: Convexifying the domain
Another explanation for the optimality of random contracts which is sometimes men-
tioned is that they convexify the principal’s domain. In this supplementary material we
explain why this intuition cannot lead to optimality of random contracts in our quasi-
linear setting.
The idea is that–using lemma 1–the principal’s problem can be written as an opti-
mization over ql only. The incentive compatibility constraint of θh requires a minimum
rent uh(ql) that has to be given to type θh depending on the choice of ql. This minimum
rent is given by
uh(ql) = ul + c(ql, θl)− c(ql, θh) = c(ql, θl)− c(qh, θh)
where the second equality follows from θl’s individual rationality constraint. In figure 2,
this means that for all (ql, uh) combinations above the ICh-curve incentive compatibility
of θh is satisfied. As depicted in the figure, this set can be non-convex.6 The figure also
depicts an indifference curve of the principal which is tangent to the implementable set












Figure 2: non-convex domain
At first, one could think that random contracts allow convex combinations between
the contracts A and B which are strictly preferred by the principal to A and B, i.e.
6A sufficient condition for this set to be convex is cqqθ ≤ 0. However, we argue that random contracts
cannot be optimal in our framework without an assumption on the sign of cqqθ.
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stochastic mechanisms allow to convexify the domain. However, this is not at all clear;
and we know from the analysis in the main text that it is actually not the case for
quasi-linear preferences.
As utilities are quasilinear, randomization in ti is pointless. From lemma 1, we know
that the decision of the high type is his first best decision. Hence, the only variable
we can randomize is ql. For illustration, let us check that randomizing between qlA and
qlB does not raise the principal’s utility. Take a convex combination putting probability
α on qlA and 1 − α on qlB. As IRl is binding, tl = αc(qlA, θl) + (1 − α)c(qlB, θl). We
know that the incentive compatibility constraint of θh will bind. Hence, the rent of θh is
uh = tl−αc(qlA, θh)−(1−α)c(qlB, θh) = α[c(qlA, θl)−c(qlA, θh)]+(1−α)[c(qlB, θl)−c(qlB, θh)].
The principal’s utility can then be written as
W = fh
(












f l(S(qlB)− c(qlB, θl)) + fh(S(qh)− c(qh, θh)− [c(qlB, θl)− c(qlB, θh)])
}
= αWA + (1− α)WB
where WA (WB) is the principal’s utility of offering the deterministic contract that gives
qlA (q
l
B) to the θ
l agent. Since both A and B are on the same indifference curve for the
principal in figure 2, WA = WB = W which means that randomization does neither in-
nor decrease the principal’s utility. If, however, the determinsitic contracts A and B
would lead to different utility levels for the principal, the randomization would lead to a
worse outcome than the best deterministic contract.
The problem with the convexification intuition is the following. Indeed, the principal







deterministic contracts A or B but this is not a feasible (incentive compatible) contract.
The random version of this contract, however, cannot generate a higher utility for the
principal than the determinsitic contracts A or B.
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